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Abstract - Dedifferentiation, paedomorphosis, and the insertion and deletion of developmental stages 
make it impossible to deduce the genealogical hierarchy frum only ontogenetic transformation series. 
Like the outgroup criterion, ontogenetic character precedence is not theory-neutral and to use it to 
deduce genealogy requires certain assumptions. 
If scientists are going to use logically unbeatable theories about the world, they might as well give 
up natural science and take up religion (Lewontin, 1972: 181). 
Introduction 
Beatty (1982) recognized two schools of phylogenetic systematics, which he called 
pattern and phylogenetic cladistics (see also Platnick, 1979). According to Brady (1982: 
288-89)’ “the pattern cladists claim that while their results are at odds with some theories, 
their method is without theoretical pre-judgement,” and that the “method of constructing 
cladograms is identical with that used by the [phylogenetic] cladists.” It is true that 
both schools emphasize synapomorphies and congruence in the discovery of sister-group 
relationships; however, methodological differences exist. For example, some pattern 
cladists advocate probability as the basis for choosing among alternative hierarchies 
(Patterson, 1982b: 41; Rosen, 1982: 80-81), as opposed to the parsimony rule regularly 
employed by the phylogenetic cladists (Farris, 1983; Kluge, 1984). An equally striking, 
and more widely acknowledged, methodological demarcation between the two schools 
concerns the criteria used to polarize character-state transformations. 
Synapomorphies (putative homologies) occur at different levels of universality, and 
several approaches have been taken to assess those levels (Wiley, 1981: 139-158). The 
deductions made by phylogenetic systematists usually involve outgroup and ontogeny 
criteria, which are the modern equivalents of Naefs (1931) principles of systematic 
precedence and ontogenetic character precedence, respectively (see also Hennig, 1966: 
95, 99). Pattern cladists have held the rather extreme position for the last few years 
that the ontogeny criterion is both necessary and sufficient for the discovery of order 
in nature (Patterson, 1982b: 67). Simply put, ontogeny is orderly-just classify ontoge- 
netically (Nelson and Platnick, 1981; Rosen, 1982). 
Phylogenetic cladists have tended to use both ontogenetic and outgroup criteria when- 
ever possible, although recently a preference has been shown for outgroup analysis. 
For example, Brooks and Wiley (1985: 10) considered “Direct observation of ontogeny 
does not resolve any cases of evolutionary change in ontogeny which outgroup compari- 
sons fail to resolve, and outgroup comparisons resolve some cases which direct observa- 
tion fails to resolve.” Farris (1982) has also shown that the outgroup criterion is a special 
application of the more general parsimony rule, which he demonstrated was indispensable 
to phylogenetic analysis (1983). 
Thus, the methods of pattern and phylogenetic cladists are not identical in all respects. 
Is the divergence of the two schools based on some fundamentally different world view? 
Beatty (1982) argued that the pattern cladists’ disillusionment with evolutionary theorizing 
led them to seek a theory-neutral and assumption-free approach to phylogenetic 
inference. He supported his position by reference to how the two schools treated species, 
as individuals or as classes (see rejoinders by Patterson, 1982a; Platnick, 1982; and 
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Brady, 1982). I believe the different views of ontogeny more clearly document the philo- 
sophical schism among phylogenetic systematists. In this context one might argue that 
the pattern cladists' motive rests on how the relation between pattern and processes 
is to be understood. I surmise that pattern cladists wish to deduce patterns from strictly 
empirical evidence so that the explanatory hypotheses pertaining to processes can be 
evaluated independently (Brady, 1982; Rosen, 1982). However, does ontogeny provide 
strictly empirical evidence of pattern, or is it embedded in theory about processes, and 
what are the consequences for understanding processes when a strictly empirical world 
view is assumed? The focus of my paper is the contention that the ontogeny criterion 
is"without theoretical prejudgement." I will conclude that its use in phylogenetic systematics 
is laden with theory and assumptions, and that the pattern cladists' preference has been 
affected by their theory-antagonistic attitude (Beatty, 1982; Brooks and Wiley, 1985). 
Uses of Ontogeny 
No two ontogenies are exactly alike. Just as there is variation among adults, at the 
individual, geographic, and species levels of examination, so is there among subadults, 
embryos, and eggs. The modification involves both deletions and insertions. While 
systematists have tended to use only adults in their search for general patterns and the 
underlying processes that produced those patterns, there is no compelling reason for 
being so exclusive (Garstang, 1922; de Beer, 1958; Bonner, 1965, 1974; Gould, 1977). 
Observations of ontogeny have three basic uses in phylogenetic systematics. They 
may provide an assessment of homology (Wiley, 1981: 121-122), serve as an extra source 
of observations with which to judge historical relationships, or serve to polarize character 
transformations. The last forms the most prominent use in cladistics. 
Literally being able to see one aspect of the phenotype transform into another during 
ontogeny (x-x in taxon A and x-x' in taxon B, with x = x')' has long been recognized 
as a powerful basis on which to establish a claim of homology (Russell, 1916; Patterson, 
1982b). Ordinarily, however, the actual transformation is not observed, and in many 
instances it cannot be witnessed. For example, the primary appendicular muscles of 
amniotes develop from undifferentiated masses of mesenchyme (termed blastema) located 
within the limb buds; whereas, in other vertebrates those muscles can be seen to develop 
from particular trunk myotomes (Smith, 1960). Similarly, a primordial mass of 
mesenchyme cells gives rise to the middle ear ossicles in some vertebrates (e.g., humans) 
and their more specific developmental origin cannot be traced (Patten, 1964). In all 
cases where ontogenetic character precedence is not observed, the test of homology is 
reduced to congruence among synapomorphies whose levels of generality have been 
deduced using outgroup analyses. Further, as a pretest of their homology, the degree 
of topographic and compositional similarity of the derived states (x in taxon A, and 
x' in taxon B, with x = x') must be estimated (Patterson, 1982b). That there exists some 
positive relationship between similarity and homology seems to be an unavoidable 
assumption in these procedures. 
Ontogenetic transformation series may serve as a source of raw character-state data, 
in addition to those traditionally recorded from the adult stage. Hennig (1966) recognized 
this potential in his concept of semaphoront-an organism at a particular stage in 
ontogeny. He urged the study of comparable semaphoronts, and asserted that all 
semaphoront stages predict genealogy. Of course, any data collected for purposes of 
'Throughout the paper, I use lower case letters for characters, superscripts for their states, and an arrow 
between two states denotes an observed ontogenetic transformation. A simple horizontal line signifies a 
hypothesized ontogenetic transformation based on topographic and compositional similarity. Upper case 
letters are used for taxa. An equals sign between states implies homology. 
19851 ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENETICS 15 
ONTOGENETIC FOUR CHARACTER x 
STAGES TAXA x1 X *  x3 
phylogenetic inference, including those on semaphoronts, must be polarized in order 
to discover the hierarchy of synapomorphies. 
Rosen (1982) exhibited even more enthusiasm for ontogenetic data than did Hennig. 
He pointed out that ontogenetic transformation series are necessarily more informative 
CHARACTER y 
y' Y 2  Y 3  
Fig. 1 .  T h e  ontogenetic translormation wries of two three-state characters (X I - ' ,  ~ 1 . ' ' )  observed i n  four 
taxa (A-D). T h r  arrows charactrrize the drvrloptnrntal continuum between the arbitrarily chosrn three 
ontngenetir stages, prejuvenile, juvenile. and adult (example modilied after Rosen, 1982). 
A B C D A B C D 
Fig. 2. Cladograms deduced from characters x and y--adult slates only (see Fig. 1). 
A B C D A B C D 
Fig. 3. Cladograms deduced from characters x and y-all sla&s consIdncd(see Fig. 1). See text for necessary 
assumptions. 
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of a hierarchic pattern than are observations on a single stage (e.g., adults alone). For 
that reason, he argued that the study of ontogeny should be preeminent in phylogenetic 
systematics (Figs. 1-3; see also Patterson, 1982b: 67). However, the particular model 
that Rosen proposed seems to run counter to the pattern cladists’ pursuit of simplicity 
(Sober, 1975) because it allows the absence of something to be treated as the presence 
of that thing and so participate in a synapomorphy. This requires one or more assump- 
tions. Thus, one can arrive at a cladistic hypothesis, such as Rosen’s cladograms repro- 
duced here as Figure 3, only by assuming either (1) outgroups which predict that the 
presence of X I  and x* are primitive (not specialized insertions), (2) some form of recapitu- 
lation, i.e., any earlier states must have been present in the ancestral ontogeny (they 
can be lost, but not inserted), or (3) the basic information on adults (as in Fig. 2) cannot 
be contradicted. 
Both the ontogeny criterion and Rosen’s model (Figs. 1-3) assume that ontogenetic 
transformation series are fundamentally orderly (Nelson, 1978: 336; Patterson, 1982b), 
and von Baer’s law is usually cited as a strict universal supporting that proposition (Gould, 
1977). Von Baer’s law has been variously summarized, but I believe it can be fairly 
stated as development is a progression from the general to the special (Russell, 1916) or in a 
word-dzflerentiution (x-y-z-etc.). The orderliness claimed for ontogeny might be 
taken to mean a fixed monotonic progression from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. 
Von Baer’s law, as well as the ontogeny criterion, is usually associated with the 
following four rules which von Baer explicitly set forth in his classic 1828-1837 treatise 
on comparative embryology (p. 224): (1) The general features of one of the large groups 
of animals [ = general types; see explanation below] appear earlier in development than 
the special features. (2) The less general features develop from the more general, and 
so on, until finally the most specialized appears. (3) The embryo of a general type of 
animal, instead of retracing the forms of lower members of the group, diverges more 
and more from them. (4) Fundamentally, the embryo of a higher animal resembles 
only the embryo of the lower species, never its adult form.* Von Baer’s second rule 
seems to be a restatement of the first, which I interpret to be the real basis for the law 
usually attributed to him. The 3rd and 4th rules are explicit refutations of the Meckel- 
Serres law, which was later reformulated by Haeckel (1866, 1874) as the biogenetic 
law - ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. 
There are three aspects of von Baer’s research that require emphasis, and which I 
believe affect the application of his law to all levels of differentiation, as well as its inter- 
pretation as a strict universal. Firstly, von Baer recognized only three processes of differ- 
entiation - primary or germ layer formation, histological differentiation within those 
layers, and the morphological differentiation of primitive organs. He does not appear 
to have extrapolated the concept of differentiation to the level of specialization at which 
most cladists recognize novelties. Secondly, von Baer was an Aristotelian essentialist 
and, thus, his statements were about eternal, immutable patterns - they cannot possibly 
be about phylogeny (D. Hull, pers. comm.). Specifically, von Baer’s rules relate to differ- 
entiation within the limits of each of the four distinct general trpes of organisms that he 
recognized- the radiate, longitudinal, molluscan, and vertebrate. To von Baer the types 
were independent of one another; differentiation followed a different course in each 
(e.g., the vertebrate embryo showed at no time any agreement in total organization 
with any invertebrate). Lastly, the claim that differentiation never reverses itself (x- y -x’, 
with x = x‘) is a hypothesis, and its assumptions and generality warrant critical 
examination. 
Other generalizations or implied universals related to the ontogeny criterion include 
Won Baer’s 1828-1837 paper is in German, and all English translations of his rules vary somewhat. 
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those of Spencer (1864) and Nelson (1978). Recently, LQvtrup (1978: 352) claimed 
Spencer’s formulation was based on von Baer’s law, and he restated it in the form of 
a theorem: “in the course of their ontogeny the members of a set of twin taxa follow the same course 
of recapitulation up to the stage of their divergence into separate taxa. ”3 Interpreted in the philos- 
ophy of pheneticists (and perhaps pattern cladists; see below) this might be taken to 
mean that the pattern of more inclusive and less inclusive sets of taxa can be deduced 
from the congruence of their ontogenetic transformations (Danser, 1950; Patterson, 
1982b; Rosen, 1982). However, as Kopaska-Merkel and Haack (1982: 95; see also 
Rensch, 1960) have pointed out, the theorem is of little practical value in phylogenetic 
inference because “subsequent evolution [ non-terminal deletions and insertions] in one 
or both sister taxa may obscure ontogenetic evidence of the historical (genealogical) 
divergence.” The disturbing effects that nonterminal deletions and insertions have on 
the parallel between ontogeny and phylogeny have been so well-studied since the time 
of Darwin that I see little reason to devote more space to the subject in this essay. Plant 
and animal examples abound (de Beer, 1958; Gould, 1977; Holmes, 1944; Rieppel, 
1979; Stevens, 1980). 
Nelson (1978: 327) stated his law as ‘kiven an ontogenetic character transformation from a 
state observed to be more general to a state observed to be less general, the more general state is primitive, 
the less general derived.” This formulation was said to be a restatement of the biogenetic 
law4 and, thus, attributable to Haeckel (1866, 1874); however, its content has much 
in common with von Baer’s law (Stevens, 1980). Regardless of the historical endorse- 
ment, a special problem arises when Nelson’s law is put into practice in phylogenetic 
systematics because the relationship between “general” and “primitive” has been presented 
in two different ways. According to Nelson (1978: 339), “Observation determines that 
different characters sometimes have different generality. Given characters of different 
generality, the inference is that the more general character is primitive in an evolutionary 
sense, and the less general character is advanced. What do I mean by different generality? 
. . .Different ontogenetic generality: the occurrence of character x (more general) in 
species A and B, in contrast to the occurrence of character y (less general) only in species 
B” (see also p. 327). Alternatively, Nelson and Platnick (1981: 37) stated that “features 
that appear early in development can be considered primitive relative to the modifications 
of those features that appear later in development .” The problem can be seen in Figure 4 
where commonness in Nelson’s sense and ontogenetic precedence according to Nelson 
and Platnick (1981 ; or von Baer) do not necessarily lead to the same conclusion. Further- 
more, it would seem that Nelson’s law is a special form of ingroup analysis when com- 
monness is used as the estimator (Estabrook, 1977; see Wiley, 1981, for a critique of 
common equals primitive). In those cases where the ontogenetic transformation is not 
actually observed, the investigator appears to be forced to use commonness in applying 
the ontogeny criterion, or assume that similarity is a perfect index ofhomology (see above). 
The position of necessity and sufficiency of ontogeny that the pattern cladists have 
taken seems to be founded on the belief that (1) the criterion of ontogenetic precedence 
is falsifiable, but unfalsified empirically (thus, it is strictly law-like), (2) ontogeny is 
orderly, and (3) that deductions can be made from ontogeny alone that minimize the 
number of ad hoc hypotheses necessary to explain all of the data given in a study of 
sister-group relationships. In effect, pattern cladists adhere to ontogeny, and the laws 
3Such an idea is an old one, and it can probably be traced to Chambers (1844; see L@vtrup, 1981). Even 
Darwin’s (1859: 449) contention that “community in embryonic structure reveals community of descent” is 
clearly related to this notion. 
‘I have not called it the biogenetic law to avoid confusing it with recapitulation, which was rejected by 
Nelson (1973a). I have named the law for Gareth Nelson, rather than Crowson (1970: 187), because he 
more clearly stated it, and in recognition of his many contributions to phylogenetic systematics. 
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relating to it, because it frees their searches for order in nature from assumptions about 
evolutionary processes and mechanisms and prior knowledge claims of phylogeny, viz., 
“their method is without theoretical pre-judgement”- it is fundamentally simple. It is 
usually pointed out that, by comparison, the devotees of the outgroup criterion neces- 
sarily must assume relationships at some higher taxonomic level (Nelson and Platnick, 
1981). Also, Rosen (1982) has claimed that the outgroup method must make errors 
with certain ontogenetic transformations (his type VII), whereas the ontogenetic criterion 
does not. 
Falsifiability 
Nelson (1978) stated that his law was falsifiable; however, Voorzanger and van der 
Steen (1982) have concluded otherwise. The following review examines in some detail 
this difference of opinion because I believe Nelson’s to be the only bold attempt to 
formulate the criterion of ontogenetic precedence in a synthetic form. 
Nelson’s general model for testing is as follows: we are given two taxa, A and B, 
A with x untransformed during ontogeny and B with x transforming to y. Thus, x is 
more general (plesiomorphic) than y. Next, consider two other taxa, C and D, as the 
source of falsification. C has y’ untransformed throughout its ontogeny, whereas y’ trans- 
forms to x’ during D s  ontogeny. According to Nelson, his law would imply that x is 
more primitive than y and that y‘ is more primitive than x’, and this is a contradiction, 
on the assumption that x = x’ and y = y’. Further, according to Nelson, such contra- 
dictory observations would falsify his law, since a good law should not lead from co- 
herent evidence to contradictory conclusions. Nelson knew of no such falsifiers, and 
no one has published any to my knowledge. 
Voorzanger and van der Steen’s first criticism concerns the ambiguous 
conceptualization of primitiveness and generality, since they can be interpreted in either 
a strict von Baerian manner (Fig. 4) or in terms of commonness. They emphasized 
(p. 202) that “a contradiction could arise only if, e.g., ‘x is more primitive than y within 
AB’ is taken to imply ‘x is more primitive than y within any group- such as ABCD - 
containing AB.” This, they claimed, forces one to accept primitive (general) in an 
absolute sense, but at that level of universality (A, B ,  C,  D), x is as general as y, and 











Fig. 4. Von Baer’s law of ontogenetic precedence applied to two taxa, A and B. Assuming x = x‘, state 
w is taken to be more general than x. However, state x is more general than w if commonness is used as 
the estimator instead of ontogenetic precedence. 
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Fig. 5 .  The falsifiability of Nelson's law (1978) in relative terms (see text for further explanation) 
falsification in terms of an ontogenetic example is impossible. 
Voorzanger and van der Steen's second criticism of Nelson's test involves general 
being treated as a relative concept (Table 1). Assuming Nelson's model of four taxa, 
A-D, with x - x, x - y, y - y' and y' - x' ontogenetic transformations, respectively (with 
x = x' and y = y'), consider additional taxa and ontogenetic histories, E (x - x) and F 
(x - x). If A, B, E, and F are studied first, then x is more general ( = common). If C 
and D are studied next, then y is more general, and these conclusions of generality 
are contradictory and one concludes the law is falsified. But consider further the alterna- 
tive outcome of a second test, where the data are exactly the same but only the study 
collection is partitioned differently (Table 1). Here x is the more general state in both 
sets of taxa ((A,B,C,F)(D,E)), and the law is not falsified. Voorzanger and van der 
Steen were of the opinion that such opposite conclusions are not sensible, since the out- 
come of the test is affected by an arbitrary factor, like partitioning of the study collection, 
and they stated that Nelson's model for falsification is unconvincing without other 
considerations. 
Voorzanger and van der Steen's third objection to Nelson's approach is that it does 
not allow the possibility to distinguish between rival hypotheses (see also Brady, 1979: 
602). Ontogenetic data alone are inadequate to establish the validity of the law. I agree 
with their opinion that if the consequent clause of the law is to be tested it will have to 
come from phylogenetic hypotheses, not more ontogenetic data. Thus, I conclude that 
Nelson's law, while containing some empiric content, is not falsifiable in its present 
form. Equating generality with commonness is but part of the problem. 
Table 1 
Falsifiability of Nelson's Law 
Generality Tests 
1 2 
x = primitive (A.B,C,F) x = primitive I (A,B,E,F)  
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Dedifferentiation 
Von Baer’s law of differentiation (x-y-z-etc.) seems to underlie whatever form the 
ontogeny criterion takes (including Spencer’s theorem and Nelson’s law), in so far as 
orderliness is implied. What assumptions does the law make, and how general is it? 
I have undertaken a search for examples of dediffmentiation (x-y-x’) so that I might 
gain insight into its generality. Moreover, I believe those examples point up an unresolv- 
able ambiguity of these transformations which makes the law effectively useless and 
unsupportable, except at the most trivial level (e.g., adults do not develop into eggs). 
With strict differentiation in two taxa, x-x in taxon 1, and x-x‘ in taxon 2, x and 
x‘ are homologous. When dedifferentiation obtains there is no reason to expect congru- 
ence of actual developmental transformations, nor strictly hierarchic taxonomic patterns, 
because x and x’ are really not homologues, but they must be interpreted as such without 
making certain assumptions. Of course, one can guarantee that differentiation n e w  
reverses itself by distinguishing character states according to their precedence (e.g., 
x-y-z-y; the two y’s look alike, but they are different because one y comes after 
x, while the other follows z). One might also claim, as Rosen (1982) did, that the two 
y’s will always be distinguishable, i.e., that dedifferentiation never takes place. My review 
of the literature suggests that dedifferentiation exists in several kinds of organisms, and 
that it provides a common class of exceptions to von Baer’s law (Spratt, 1964; 
Waddington, 1966). 
Dedifferentiation is characteristic of regeneration in many plant and animal tissues, 
and it has been most intensively studied in salamander limbs (Butler, 1933; Grant, 
1978; Steen, 1970; Thornton, 1938). Typically in salamanders, hystolysis (the dedifferen- 
tiation of stump tissues) follows the amputation of the limb. The bundles of muscle 
cells break down and lose their myofibrillar architecture to become single mononucleate 
myoblasts. The cartilage matrix dissolves as well, and the individual cells are released 
from it. Connective tissue is similarly altered during histolysis. The dedifferentiated 
cells of muscle, cartilage, and connective tissue, once having lost their specialized 
organelles and regained their enlarged nuclei and basophilic cytoplasm, form a blastema 
and enter the new growth-duplication cycle leading to regeneration of tissues. 
The question of whether the blastemal cells have reverted to their totipotent embryonic 
state has been answered, to my satisfaction, with irradiation-tissue transplant experi- 
ments. It seems that in at least some salamanders, there are different degrees of meta- 
plasy , viz., the transformation of one specialized tissue, through dedifferentiation, into 
another. For example, connective tissue can be a progenitor of all others-cartilage, 
perichondrium, muscle, as well as connective tissue- whereas muscle is less labile, and 
cartilage even less so. A graft of radioactively doubly-labeled cartilage can be shown 
to give rise mostly to new cartilage; however, it also produces a few perichondral cells 
and fibroblasts. Labeled implanted myoblasts differentiate into more cell types, including 
cartilage. Other examples in vertebrates include lens regeneration (Connelly, 1980; 
Reyer, 1977; Watanabe, 1978) and “transdifferentiation” of bladder epithelium (Cunha 
et al., 1980). 
Dedifferentiation is also well-documented among the invertebrates, especially in 
Planaria and Hydra. In an extreme case of regeneration, isolated gastrodermal cells are 
known to dedifferentiate, lose their mucoid and secretory granules, become interstitium- 
like, and regenerate all of the other cell types characteristic of a complete Hydra (Grant, 
1978). Translocations in the ontogeny of other invertebrates include the lophophores 
in phoronids and the gut in the Bryozoa (Hyman, 1959; Siewing, 1963). 
Even normal molting in acariform mites involves the regression and dedifferentiation 
of most body tissues. In fact, the tissues of the limbs and gnathosoma completely 
dedifferentiate and reform before ecdysis (Woodring, 1969). The “calyptostasis” pattern 
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of development found in chiggers, velvet-mites, and water-mites, comprising some 75 
families and thousands of species (Grandjean, 1957; van der Hammen, 1964, 1978, 
1981), is of special interest as an exception to von Baer’s law. In calyptostasis, every 
alternate stadium is degenerate morphologically and completely pharate, viz., never 
emerging from the cuticle of the previous stadium. Thus, in tracing the ontogeny of 
most external cuticular structures in these groups, such as legs, sensilla, and the like, 
a structure appears, then disappears, appears, disappears, and reappears again (B. 
OConner, pers. comm.). A similar pattern occurs in the nematode Hemityciophhora arenaria 
where the somatic musculature breaks down and reforms at each molt (Johnson et al., 
1970). Dedifferentiatiodredifferentiation also occurs in certain plant tissues (e.g., the 
epidermis; W. H. Wagner, Jr . ,  pers. comm.; Foster, 1949: 66-67). 
Paedomorphosis 
It is generally acknowledged that paedomorpho~is~, the phylogenetic loss of adult 
characters, obscures the genealogical hierarchy (Nelson, 1978; Nelson and Platnick, 
1981; Stevens, 1980). However, paedomorphosis is a special problem in any specific 
case because evidence for it depends on some prior hypothesis of phylogeny. Advocate 
another set of sister-group relationships and the claim of ancestral juvenile characters 
being retained in the adult may no longer be required to reach the simplest explanation 
for the data (Fink, 1982). Still, no one seems to doubt the existence of paedomorphosis 
in some situations. For example, it can be observed in salamanders when it is facukative, 
i.e., those cases where not all individuals of a local interbreeding population meta- 
morphose and acquire the characteristics of the terminal stages of ontogeny of their 
siblings and immediate relatives. The more troublesome question is how are we to dis- 
cover its existence where the species is an obligate paedomorph and much of the pheno- 
type, save the gonads, has retarded development? I agree with Eldredge and Cracraft’s 
(1980) suggestion that one should let the outgroup criterion, multiple character congru- 
ence, and parsimony be the “arbiter” of hypotheses of paedomorphosis, for how else 
could something absent be discovered (Nelson, 1978: 339)? 
Ontogeny and Parsimony 
Nelson (1973a) claimed that assuming an earlier and more general attribute in ontogeny 
to be primitive perforce minimizes the number of ad hoc hypotheses (ontogenetic reversals) 
necessary to explain the phylogeny of a character (see also Bonde, 1976; and Nelson, 
1978). Nelson coupled his point of view on ontogeny/parsimony with the thesis that 
assessing character-state primitiveness with ontogenetic transformation series was a direct 
method, and, unlike the indirect outgroup criterion, was free of the assumption of a higher 
level cladogram. Nelson’s position seems to rest on the assumption that his law holds- 
that the condition “in the young stages can be considered primitive” (Nelson and Platnick, 
1981: 38). In effect, he must assume that paedomorphosis (see above) and ontogenetic 
insertions do not apply. Thus, it seems to me that both the ontogeny and outgroup 
criteria require certain assumptions, and that describing them as direct and indirect 
has nothing to do with their relative parsimony debts. Moreover, since each criterion 
serves to cover the assumptions of the other, one might argue that they should be used 
in concert whenever possible. Ultimately, multiple character congruence and parsimony 
will arbitrate contradictory predictions of a character’s polarity. 
Lundberg (1973: 327) was the first to respond to Nelson’s claim and he asserted that 
inspecting the ontogenies of two species “cannot alone distinguish among evolutionary 
5Neoteny of some authors. 
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hypotheses on the basis of parsimony” (Nelson’s 1973b rebuttal notwithstanding). 
Lundberg focused on the point that to claim that the ‘loss of something primitively 
present’ is less parsimonious than the ‘gain of something primitively absent’ requires 
a third taxon (an outgroup to Nelson’s two-taxon statement). The disagreement, and 
its resolution, may be more clearly understood with the simple illustrations in Figure 6. 
Given two taxa, A and B, one changes in some way during its ontogeny (x-y in taxon 
B), while the other does not (x-x in taxon A). Nelson’s position is that to attribute 
the x-y transformation to the common ancestor C of A and B ,  as in hypothesis 2 of 
Figure 6, is to admit two evolutionary transformations when only one is necessary to 
explain the data, as in hypothesis 1. The extra transformation is the ‘prior gain’ of what- 
ever is subsequently ‘lost.’ Lundberg‘s point was that a higher level phylogeny, involving 
an outgroup D (as in Fig. 7), is assumed in the notion of ‘prior gain.’ According to 
Donoghue and Maddison (1982) the ontogeny-parsimony argument can be effectively 
reduced to using “non-life” as the outgroup. Furthermore, it is only when the particular 
conditions of the outgroup (D) are specified that the relative parsimony of the alternatives 
can be correctly assessed, unless Nelson’s law is assumed (Fig. 7). For example, if D2 
with the x-y transformation were the ancestor of C, hypothesis 2 would be more parsi- 
monious, if D1 with x-x transformation were the ancestor of C, hypothesis 1 would 
be more parsimonious, and so on. Given only two taxa, as in Figure 6, the alternative 
hypotheses cannot be distinguished on the basis of parsimony. 
The Generality of Ontogeny 
It is common knowledge that structural phenotypes, such as integument, bones, heart, 
and the like, have developmental histories (Patterson, 198213). Even the behavioral 
phenotype appears generally to exhibit ontogeny, as does the emotional-intellectual 
(Piaget and Inhelder, 1969). However, it is not obvious that karyotypes, all polypeptides, 
individual amino acids, and genes exhibit “ontogeny.” Does this mean that data drawn 
from those sources can have no hierarchic pattern of their own, and are irrelevant to 
phylogenetic systematics? I believe pattern cladists with their extreme view of ontogenetic 
character precedence would have to answer in the affirmative. Of course such data could 
be forced into a hierarchic pattern by a clustering algorithm, or fitted to a pattern deduced 
from characters that do exhibit ontogeny, but in either case their contribution to phylo- 
genetic inference would not be improved. What if, for example, karyotypic change was 
responsible for speciation (as with polyploidy)? Wouldn’t pattern cladists discount a priori 
the very data necessary to characterize those sister-group relationships? An equally 
serious dilemma concerns the many unicellular organisms (e. g., bacteria and protists) 
( X - X )  ( X - Y )  
a HYPOTHESIS 1 b HYPOTHESIS 2 
Fig. 6. Alternative interpretations of the ontogenetic transformation in the common ancestor of two 
taxa, A and B.  
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( x + x  ( x + y )  ( . x - + x )  ( x - y )  
A 
vB ( X - X )  C AvB ( X - Y )  C 
( x  - D1’/ x )  \ X Y Y )  ( x - x )  D1’/ \;yy ) 
D2 D3 D* D3 
( x - y )  ( y - x )  ( x - y )  ( y - x )  
a HYPOTHESIS 1 b HYPOTHESIS 2 
Fig. 7 .  Different ontogenetic transformations in the outgroup D ,  and their effect on choosing among 
alternative hypotheses on the basis of parsimony. 
which may be without any ontogeny. How would the pattern cladist proceed to infer 
their sister-group relationships, if not by outgroup analysis? 
My survey, although by no means exhaustive, suggests that many, but not all, proteins 
exhibit ontogeny (Uy and Wold, 1977), whereas few, if any, “genes” do. Some amino 
acids have what could be called ontogeny, but the purine and pyrimidine bases do not. 
The usual karyotypic characters employed in phylogenetic systematics also seem to be 
without ontogeny. 
Insulin provides an excellent example (Fig. 8) of the ontogeny of a protein (Stryer, 
1981). In mammals (e.g., humans, cows, etc.), the active hormone consists of two 
separate chains - an A chain of 2 1 amino-acid residues and a B chain of 30 residues - 
which are covalently linked by two disulfide bonds. Proinsulin has no hormonal activity 
in these mammals, but it is the direct precursor of the hormone insulin. Proinsulin is 
a single polypeptide, which consists of the A and B chains covalently linked by an addi- 
tional sequence of about 30 amino acid residues, the C chain. Further, recent studies 
have found preproinsulin, a polypeptide containing the A, B ,  and C chains plus an 
PREPROINSULIN PROINSULIN INSULIN 
Fig. 8. The ontogeny of insulin (modified after Stryer, 1981). A. The A chain. B.  The B chain. C.  
The connecting peptide chain. D. The amino-terminal sequence, -s-s- are disulfide links. 
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amino-terminal sequence of 16 residues which is not present in proinsulin. This amino- 
terminal sequence is thought to channel the preproinsulin molecule to the endoplasmic 
reticulum, where proinsulin is formed from it by cleavage of the 16 amino acid terminal 
peptide. Proteolysis of the connecting C peptide chain, to form the separate A and B 
chains of mature insulin, takes place in the storage granules of the Golgi apparatus. 
I interpret the enzymatic conversion of preproinsulin to insulin to be an example of 
a molecular ontogenetic transformation; however, not all proteins have such an ontogeny. 
A few of the cytosine residues in the DNA of higher eukaryotes, as well as those in 
some lower eukaryotes, are methylated (Ehrlich and Wang, 1981). Such methylation 
may be dependent on DNA synthesis and completed shortly after DNA replication, 
or it may be completed long after DNA synthesis. Methylation of eukaryotic DNA seems 
to have many functions, including regulating the transcription of certain genes, increas- 
ing the rate of mutations, and increasing the stability of sections of the double helix. 
Differentiation is probably one of the functions because DNA methylation is correlated 
with the transcription of some genes (Caplan and Ordahl, 1978; Ehrlich and Wang, 1981). 
I consider only some post-translational modifications of a protein as ontogenesis, and 
it is important to note that some of those changes are known to be reversible. According 
to Uy and Wold (1977: 890), such changes involve noncovalent and covalent interactions 
“which lead to the folding of the polypeptide chain and the association of individual 
chains with each other,” and “the transport of the protein from the site of synthesis to 
the site of action.” However, not all post-translational modifications may be equated 
with ontogeny. For example, phosphorylation of some tyrosine residues is a post- 
translational modification that is readily reversible, and appears to be an important 
mechanism for regulating protein activities. The same molecules can be alternately phos- 
phorylated or “de-phosphorylated” depending on the metabolic state of the cell. Although 
DNA methylation is less labile than protein phosphorylation it, too, may be found to 
fluctuate within the “lifetime” of a given DNA molecule. 
Conclusions 
Ontogeny does not always provide unambiguous evidence of the hierarchy of 
genealogy. Furthermore, certain major groups of living things (prokaryotes, single-cell 
eukaryotes) may have no ontogeny. Must we then despair of inferring a phylogeny for 
these organisms? Von Baeh law does not account for dedifferentiation, and the practical 
value of ontogenetic transformation series in deducing the natural order is significantly 
affected by deleted and inserted stages. A counterargument to my claim about von Baer’s 
law being inconsistent with dedifferentiation could take the form of the truism that ‘adults 
don’t develop into eggs’ (G. Nelson, pers. comm.). However, I suggest that such a 
position robs von Baer’s rules, and the summary law(s), of whatever empirical content 
they might have. Also, it must be acknowledged that deleted and inserted stages cannot 
be deduced with the ontogeny criterion alone. In order to detect those stages one must 
perform phylogenetic analysis by some other means, such as outgroup comparison, 
multiple character congruence, and parsimony. Further, it seems doubtful that the 
number of ad ~ O G  hypotheses about character evolution can be minimized with the 
ontogeny criterion, without appealing to an outgroup at some level. When the generality 
of ontogenetic data is estimated from the commonness of the character states one is 
endorsing ingroup analysis and is thus accepting its underlying assumptions. 
Like the outgroup criterion, ontogenetic character precedence is not theory-neutral 
and its use in deducing sister-group relationships requires certain assumptions. To main- 
tain the position that von Baer’s law is a universal in the strict sense and that the study 
of ontogeny is both necessary and sufficient to do phylogenetic systematics will only 
be to the detriment of our understanding the origin of diversity and how it is constrained 
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by intrinsic factors. In fact, it will actually prevent discovery of phenomena such as 
paedomorphosis and non-linear ontogenetic sequences. Moreover, to classify only by 
the ontogenetic criterion is to give the impression that it really doesn’t matter whether 
ontogeny reflects evolution and that the inference of phylogeny is not a goal. This is 
unacceptable to phylogenetic cladists because they are interested in discovering historical 
patterns and the processes that produce them. 
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